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NOTES

ber of harmless and legitimate uses, justifies a requirement of
proof that hypodermic instruments were intended to be used in a
prohibited manner. The Nicolosi and Johnson cases contain no
indication that in order to be found guilty of unlawful possession
of a narcotic drug the possessor must intend to use the drug at
all. Whether the ruling and the language of the instant case were
intended to apply as well to cases involving possession of narcotic drugs is not clear. As there is very limited legitimate use
to be made of narcotics, it is submitted that the court might very
well intend to draw a distinction between the possession of hypodermic instruments and the possession of narcotics, and in the
latter case to require only a showing that the possessor know
that he possessed a narcotic.
Daniel J. McGee
EVIDENCE - PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - RIGHT OF ACCUSED
TO INSPECT PRIOR STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT WITNESSES

Defendant was convicted in federal district court of falsely
swearing that he was not a Communist. On cross examination
two government witnesses admitted making oral and written reports to the FBI concerning alleged Communist activities of the
defendant. Defendant then moved that the court order production of these reports by the government for inspection and use
in impeaching the witnesses. The motion was denied. The court
of appeals upheld this denial on the ground that defendant had
not laid the necessary foundation of inconsistency between the
contents of the reports and the witnesses' testimony. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed and
remanded. A foundation of inconsistency is not required for production. It is enough that the specific prior statements, written
or orally made, touch the events and activities about which the
witnesses have testified. Further, the practice of giving documents to the trial judge for his decision as to their relevancy
without first allowing the defendant to see them and present
arguments for their production is disapproved. Finally, if the
government under a claim of privilege withholds the reports
when ordered to produce them, the criminal action should be dismissed. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
In prosecutions involving the question of production by the
government of prior statements of its witnesses, the federal

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

346

[Vol. XVIII

criminal cases which have been appealed involve a typical situation. The government introduces a witness. Counsel for defendant cross examines the witness and learns of a prior statement
made to the government. In order to see whether the prior statement can be used to impeach the witness' credibility, 1 defendant
moves that the court compel the government to produce it. If
the court overrules the motion, the issues on appeal are whether
defendant can compel the prosecution to produce, during trial,
the prior statements of its witnesses, and if so, what foundation
must be laid to compel production. 2 A further question concerns
the proper procedure the trial judge should follow in determining
whether the prior statement is relevant for impeachment purposes.
Two federal cases in the 1920'ss adhered to the general rule

that defendant could not compel production of prior statements
of government witnesses. 4 In 1932, however, the Fourth Circuit
held defendant did have a right to production, 5 and the Second
Circuit indicated such a right might exist under the proper cir-

cumstances."

Nevertheless, during the next two decades the

United States Supreme Court and most of the circuit courts held

7
that defendant could not compel production of prior statements.
The Second Circuit did not follow these cases, however, and in
1944 re-emphasized its former dictum 8 and held that defendant
had a right to production provided he first showed contradiction
1. Such a prior contradictory statement is introduced not for its truth, but to
neutralize the witness' testimony. 3 WIoMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, n. 3 (3d ed.
1940). In the federal system the fact that the witness admits the prior statement contradicts his testimony does not preclude introduction of the statement
into evidence. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 420 (1953) ; United States
v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1944).
2. Defendant in a federal criminal case has the right to discovery of documents
before trial by virtue of FED. R. CRIm. P. 16, 17. The right to production during
trial, however, has developed through case law.
3. Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Arnstein v. United
States, 296 Fed. 946 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (prior statement in possession of atate
prosecutor).
4. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2224, n. 1 (3d ed. 1940). See also Annot., 52
A.L.R. 207 (1928), and cases cited therein.
5. Asgill v. United States, 60 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1932).
6. United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1932) (dictum).
7. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; Neal v. United States,
203 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1953) ; D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th
Cir. 1951) ; Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Boehm v.
United States, 123 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Little v. United States, 93 F.2d 401
(8th Cir. 1937) ; United States v. Toner, 77 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1948), reversed on other grounds, 173 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1949). Contra, United States v.
Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (factual situation and rationale
of the court strikingly similar to that of the instant case).
8. United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1932).
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between the prior statement and the witness' testimony." In five

subsequent decisions the Second Circuit adhered to this rule. 10
Finally, in 1953 the United States Supreme Court in Gordon v.
United States" recognized the right of a defendant to produc-

tion, although to what extent it adopted the Second Circuit's
limitation on production was not entirely clear. 12 The first federal case to apply the Gordon holding interpreted that decision
as meaning that defendant could compel production merely by
making certain his demand was for specific documents in the
hands of the prosecution. 3 Subsequent cases, however, held

that the Gordon decision had adopted the position that defendant must lay a foundation of inconsistency before production
4

would be compelled.1

In the instant case the court interpreted the Gordon decision
as requiring only that defendant demand specific documents con-

taining prior statements which touch the testimony of the witness. The court pointed out a practical difficulty inherent in
the majority of the previous interpretations; only rarely could

a defendant know that the prior statement contradicted the testimony unless the witness admitted this on the stand.

5

In the

9. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) (prior statement
exculpated the defendant).
10. United States v. De Normand, 149 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1945) (contradictions of minor nature; refusal to compel production upheld); United States v.
Simonds, 148 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1945) (inspection by judge revealed no contradiction; production denied) ; United States v. Cohen, 148 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1945)
(same) ; United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) (for production
purposes, prior statement must show contradiction; but note dissent in which
Justice Frank denied that the Krulewitch case imposed such a restriction);
United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) (judge need not compel
production of non-contradictory statement) ; cf. United States v. Walker, 190
F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1951) (no showing of contradiction; production refused).
11. Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953).
12. Referring to the facts of the case, the court stated that "defense counsel
laid a foundation for his demand by showing that the documents . . . were made
by the Government's witness under examination, [and] were contradictory of his
present testimony." Id. at 418. The court next seemed to characterize the proper
demand broadly as one "for production of these specific documents," and which
"did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among documents possessed
by the Government on the chance that something impeaching might turn up."
Id. at 419.
.. 13. United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
14. United States v. Fontana, 231 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1956) (disapproved production with no foundation of inconsistency, yet did not reverse) ; United States
v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d
861 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 992 (1955) ; Scanlon v. United
States, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955) ; Simmons v. United States, 220 F.2d 377
(D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953). But Bee
United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955) (trial judge should compel
production if he finds anything contradictory in the prior statement).
15. See United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, No. 14694 (C.C. Va. 1807)
(cited in the instant case).
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absence of such an admission a defendant might have been denied inspection of a document valuable for impeachment purposes, 16 under the previous majority view.
The problem of production has involved an additional question, that of the proper procedure for determining relevancy of
the prior statement for impeachment purposes. Under the previous jurisprudence, the decision as to the statement's relevancy
was uniformly thought to depend on the discretion of the trial

court. 17 The approved procedure was for the trial judge to ex-

amine the prior statement in his chambers.' If he refused to
allow inspection by the defendant because the document was
irrelevant, he was to seal it in the record to be sent up on appeal.' 9
Decisions varied as to whether the denial of inspection was
merely nonprejudicial error 20 or not error at all.21
The majority opinion in the instant case disapproved of the
customary practice of allowing the trial judge to decide the state22
ment's relevancy without first letting the defendant see it. It
was felt that the trial judge should hear defendant's arguments
before deciding the question of relevancy, and that defendant
could only present such arguments after he had seen the documents. This innovation prompted an Act of Congress which
re-established the old custom of allowing the judge to determine
relevancy in chambers. 23

The act provides that the judge may

excise portions of the statement he considers irrelevant, but that
the entire document must be sent up with the record, should defendant appeal his ruling.
16. See United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952)
(rationale similar to that of the instant case).
17. Simmons v. United States, 220 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Neal v. United
States, 203 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Coplon, 186 F.2d 629 (2d
Cir. 1950) ; Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1947) ; United
States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946).
18. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v.
Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531
(2d Cir. 1955) ; Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953) ; United
States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Simonds, 148
F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
cf. Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S.

992 (1955).

19. United States v. Simonds, 148 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v.
Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944).
20. United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1951) United States v.
De Normand, 149 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1945).
21. E.g., Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. granted,
350 U.S. 992 (1955); United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955)
Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953).
22. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957).
23. 71 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. 1957).
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A problem distinct from that of production occurs in cases

where the government refuses to produce prior statements,
claiming they are privileged. Although some decisions prior to

the instant case indicated that the trial judge should be scrupulous in protecting the secrecy of the FBI files, 24 the majority of

the federal cases held that the prosecution could not, by claiming privilege, suppress documents touching the pertinent activities of the accused, 25 and that a refusal to produce relevant prior
statements would result in dismissal of the action.26 While it is
true that this rule evolved from a balancing of the government's

interest in secrecy against the defendant's interest in material
relevant to his defense, 27 it appears that the procedure of having
the trial judge balance these interests in dealing with a claim
of privilege was no longer followed; it had been decided as a
matter of law that the defendant's interest was paramount. The
majority in the instant case simply reaffirmed the rule that
withholding relevant documents on the ground of privilege would
result in dismissal of the case. The dissenters, however, seemed

to feel that the question of privilege was still a matter to be
decided by the trial judge, once he had inspected the statement.
Apparently one aim of the Act of Congress was to allow the
judge to do just that.28 Yet the act does not use the word "privilege" when it speaks of inspection of the statement by the trial
court, and so the rule on privilege re-emphasized by the majority
in the instant case would seem to be changed by the act only in
one particular. Formerly, if the government withheld the prior
24. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951); Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; United States v. Bortlik, 119 F. Supp. 425
(N.D. Pa. 1954); United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal.
1952).
25. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953) (dictum) ; Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734 (D.C.
Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States
v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d
580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944)
United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
26. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1 (1953) (dictum) ; Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734 (D.C.
Cir. 1952); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948). But see
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (acknowledges
possibility of striking witness' testimony instead of dismissing the case). Apparently, however, the case would be remanded to allow the government to produce
the statement and continue prosecution. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957) ; Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (semble);
United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Beekman,
155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Andolsehek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1944).
27. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F.Supp. 731, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
28. S. REP,. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
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statement of its witness, the trial court would dismiss the action;
under the act the trial court may either strike the testimony of
that witness or, if the interests of justice require it, declare a
29
mistrial.
Thus the instant case and the ensuing act appear to have
settled the clash between the interests of privilege and production. The defendant in a federal criminal case may, by demanding specific documents, compel production of prior statements
touching the testimony of a government witness who has testified, 0 and the trial judge will determine relevancy of these statements in chambers. 8 1 However, should the government elect to
claim its privilege and withhold the documents, the witness' testi2
mony will be stricken or a mistrial declared.
Jerre Lloyd
EVIDENCE -

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-

RIGHT OF

ACCUSED

TO INSPECT PRIOR STATEMENTS OF STATE WITNESSES

Defendant was convicted of rape. At the trial the prosecutrix
stated during cross examination that she had made a written
statement to the police just after the alleged offense. Defendant
moved for production of the statement by the prosecution for
possible use in impeaching the prosecutrix. 1 The district attorney offered to produce the statement voluntarily if defendant
would read all of it to the jury, but defendant refused this conditional offer. The trial court then declined to compel production, and the Louisiana Supreme Court held, affirmed. Defendant had not laid the foundation necessary for production by
showing either that production of the prior statement was
"essential" to defendant or "was contrary in any respect" to the
prosecutrix's testimony. State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So.2d
305 (1957).
29. 71 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. 1957).
30. Jeneks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). However, defendant cannot
utilize this procedure prior to trial to obtain statements of a prospective government witness. United States v. Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
31. 71 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. 1957).
32. Ibid.
1. The credibility of a witness may be impeached by showing that the witness
has made a prior statement which contradicts his testimony, provided a foundation is laid by calling the attention of the witness to the circumstances in which
the prior statement was made. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950). If the prior statement
is introduced, it does not serve to prove the truth of what it says, but is admitted
solely to neutralize the testimony of the witness. E.g., State v. Bodoin, 153 La.
641, 96 So. 501 (1923).

